Writing Tiny, Efficient, And Reliable Malware

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I recently gave a talk on malware development at SteelCon, covering various topics such as dealing with dependencies, compiling time API hashing, userland hooks, and evasion.

 You can watch the talk on YouTube and find code and slides on GitHub

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